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THE SHARE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
IN A DECLARATION OF WAR
A suiBcT of warm debate in the convention which framed the Con-*
stitution of the United States was where the power of making or declar-
ing war should be vested.
The committee of detail reported in favor of giving Congress power
"to make war." Pinkney opposed this on the floor, preferring to be-
stow it on the Senate. That this was also the view of Hamilton appears
in the draft of a constitution which he gave to Madison, towards the
close of the convention.' In the debate on the report, Pinkney urged
that it "would be singular for one authority to make war, and another,
peace." Butler, who followed him, thought the President was the
proper depositary. It was then moved to make the clause read "to
declare war," instead of "to make war." Gerry said that he had
"never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the execu-
tive alone to declare war." Mason thought that neither the executive
nor the Senate could safely be intrusted with the power of war; and
finally the word declare was substituted for make by the large majority
of States.2
As a declaration of war takes thus the shape of a special Act of Con-
gress, it requires, like any other bill, order, vote, or resolution, the ap-
proval of the President. It must be then the product of an agreement
of mind between three depositaries of governmental power. The two
Houses of Congress first successively agree, and the President then
manifests his assent.
It will be remembered that a formal declaration of war, until recently,
was not, as a matter of international law, necessary or indeed usual.
Most wars during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were fought
I Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, I1, 619, 622.
2 1W., II, 143, 168, 182; Elliot, Debates, V, 439.
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under the rule of a word and a blow, with the blow coming first and the
word possibly left unsaid.-
The United States, since it adopted its present Constitution, has
been engaged in eight foreign wars.
The first, coming at the close of the eighteenth century (1798-1800),
was a limited or imperfect war, as distinguished from a general war.
Congress authorized acts of hostility on the sea against vessels of France
by way of reprisal, without any formal declaration of war. "Such a
declaration by Congress might have constituted a perfect state of war,
which was not intended by the government." 4 The reasons of the
action. taken by Congress were stated; namely, "depredations on the
commerce of the United States," and captures of American vessels "in
violation of the law of nations and treaties between the United States
and the French nation."
The second war was with Tripoli (1800-1805). She declared war
against us. We recognized a state of war as existing, but acted only on
the defensive, through a naval expedition, and made, ourselves, no
formal declaration of war.
The third war was against Algiers, and our action (Act of March 3,
1815) was substantially the same as that in the case of the Tripolitan
War.
The fourth war was that of 1812 with Great Britain. Congress then
made a declaration of the existence of war between the two countries.
No statement was made as to its causes or objects (Act of June 18, 1812).
The fifth was the Mexican War. Here the President informed
Congress that Mexico had invaded the United States and that a state
of war existed. Congress responded by an Act (of May 13, 1846)
reciting that war existed by the act of Mexico and providing for the
support of hostilities. A motion in the House of Representatives for a
declaration of war was rejected by a large majority. The House of Rep-
resentatives in the next Congress, on January 31, 1848, passed a reso-
lution "that the war was unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun
3 Woolsey, Introduction to the Study of International Law, sec. 115; Calvo,
Le Droit Internaoional, IV, sees. 1903 et seq.; Takahashi, International Law applied
to the Russo-Japanese War, Chap. 1, see. 1; this JouRNAL, 2: 57.
4 Bas v. Tingy, 4 Dallas, 37: see Talbot v. Seaman, 1 Cranch, 1.
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by the President of the United States." John Adams wrote of it in
1815:-1
M/fr. Madison's administration has proved great points, long disputed
in Europe and America.
1. He has proved that an administration under our present Con-
stitution can declare war.
2. That it can make peace.
The sixth of our foreign wars was that with Spain. Here a special
Act of Congress (of April 20, 1898) presented an ultimatum, and was in
effect a declaration of war, unless the demand stated should be imme-
diately complied with. Spain did not comply with it, but withdrew
her minister at Washington, and on April 25, 1898, a declaration of wax
was recommended by the President, adopted by Congress, and approved
by him. This enacted "that war be, and the same is hereby declared
to exist, and has existed since the twenty-first day of April Anno Domini
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, including said day, between the
United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain."
It will be observed that, in this formal declaration, no causes of
grievance against Spain are stated.
Of our six foreign wars, then, preceding those now being waged with
Germany and Austria-Hungary, only one, and that the first, was
prosecuted under a declaration of war setting forth the causes leading
up to it.
An important advance in regulating the relations of nations to each
other was made in 1907 by the Convention as to the mode of opening
hostilities, which was adopted ad referendum, by the second Hague
Conference.
In this (Article I) the contracting Powers recognized that hostilities
between them should not commence without a preliminary and un-
equivocal notice, which should have either the form of a declaration of
war, stating the reasons for it (motive), or that of an ultimatum, with
a declaration of wax in case of the rejection of the ultimatum. One
of the leading participants in the conference has expressed himself
thus in regard to the provision for a statement of the reasons for
declaring war:
5 Life and Works, X, 167.
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It will be noted that the declaration and the ultimatum require
a statement of the reason of the war, and it is to be hoped that the diffi-
culty of a perfect justification may exercise a restraining influence upon
prospective belligerents. . . It must be admitted that the conven-
tion is very modest, for it leaves the Powers free to declare war at their
pleasure, provided only that the pretext be capable of formulation. 6
The United States ratified this convention in 1909; and Article I
was to take effect in case of war between two or more of the contracting
Powers. Germany having also ratified it during the same year, when
the President last spring became satisfied that the United States should
enter into war with that empire, or that war substantially existed be-
tween them already, he called a special session of Congress to which he
communicated his views on April 3, 1917.
As causes of war he mentioned these:
1. Germany's announcement that from and after February 1, 1917,
"it was its purpose to put aside all restraints of law or of humanity and
use its submarines to sink every vessel that sought to approach either
the ports of Great Britain and Ireland or the western coasts of Europe
or any of the ports controlled by the enemies of Germany within the
Mediterranean."
2. Germany's execution of that purpose, involving such a submarine
warfare against commerce as is a "warfare against mankind" and all
nations, in the course of which American ships have been sunk. and
American lives taken.
3. The vindication of human right, of which the United States "is
only a single champion."
4. Germany's denial of "the right of neutrals to use arms at all
within the areas of the sea which it has proscribed, even in the defense
of rights which no modern publicist has ever before questioned their
right to defend."
5. Her intimation that the armed guards carried by American mer-
chantmen would be treated as pirates.
6. The menace to the peace of the world and the freedom, of its
peoples flowing from "the existence of autocratic governments, backed
by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the
will of their people."
6 Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences, I, 519, 522.
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7. The impossibility of maintaining "a steadfast concert for peace,"
except by a partnership of democratic nations, as "no autocratic govern-
ment could be trusted to keep faith within it, or observe its covenants."
8. The sending by Germany of spies and intriguers into the United
States.
9. Our conviction "that in such a government, following such
methods, we can never have a friend; and that in the presence of its
organized power, always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what
purpose, can be no assured security for the democratic governments of
the world."
10. Our resolution to fight "for the ultimate peace of the world and
for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included; for the
rights of nations, great and small, and the privilege of men everywhere
to choose their way of life and of obedience."
11. The duty of the United States, as "one of the champions of the
rights of mankind," to make these "as secure as the faith and the
freedom of nations can make them," and to make the world "safe for
democracy."
12. That Germany is acting through "an irresponsible government
which has thrown aside all considerations of humanity and of right, and
is running amuck."
13. That the United States will "fight for the things which we have
always carried nearest our hearts - for democracy, for the right of those
who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for
the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right
by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to
all nations and-make the world itself at last free."
To this message Congress promptly responded by the following
resolution of April 6, 1917:
Joint Resolution Declaring that a state of war exists between the
Imperial German Government and the Government and people of the
United States and making provision to prosecute the same.
Whereas the Imperial German Government has committed repeated
acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States
of America; therefore be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, that the state of war between
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the United States and the Imperial German Government which has
been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and
that the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to employ
the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources
of the government to carry on war against the Imperial German Govern-
ment; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination all the re-
sources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United
States.
It will be noticed that the distinction is here observed which was
made in the President's message, between the Imperial German Govern-
ment and the German people, and that, on the other hand, it is stated
that the German Government has made war against both the Govern-
ment and the people of the United States.
It is to be noted, also, that Congress has not specified what were the
"repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the
United States" by which war has been "thrust upon the United States."
It is hardly open to dispute that of the grounds of complaint men-
tioned by the President in his address, those above numbered 1, 2, 4, 5, 8,
9, and 12 may be regarded as American grievances, justifying war.
Those numbered 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 13, present a somewhat different
question. In them German attacks upon the peace of the world, and
the freedom of peoples; the evils of autocratic government; the libera-
tion of the peoples of the world, the German peoples included; and the
duty of making the world safe for democracy, of securing the rights
and liberties of free peoples, and of seeking to set up such a concert
between them as will make the whole world free, are set forth as causes
for our going to war. The matters which the President here sets up
touch us less directly than do the other matters to which he referred.
They are questions of world politics, and of worldwide application.
Congress did not see fit to put them into its list of grievances, in terms;
but it does not invalidate the declaration of war, that the President and
Congress have not agreed on precisely the same statements to support it.
They have agreed, however, in the result of making, by the action of
each, a declaration that war exists.
Such a declaration is analogous to a judgment of a court, held by
several judges, which recites certain premises on which it is founded.
All the judges may agree on the terms of the judgment, and yet a mi-
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nority may dissent from the reasons stated by the majority in support of
it. Such a difference of opinion does not make the judgment any the
less conclusive on the parties. The result is reached unanimously,
though by different paths.
In most countries no questions of this character can arise, because
a declaration of war has been with them a simple act of the executive
power, though it may subsequently require parliamentary ratification.
In the United States it is a dual act. It is put in words by Congress:
it is then to be put in effect by the President's approval of those words
and proclamation of what has been so enacted. A new international
status is thus created, authorizing such action as he may deem proper in
his capacity of commander-in-chief of the army and navy. In the
language of the Supreme Court of the United States:
War can alone be entered into by national authority; it is instituted
for national purposes, and directed to national objects. . . . Even in
the case of one enemy against another enemy, therefore, there is no
color of justification for any hostile act, unless it be authorized by some
act of the government giving the public constitutional sanction to it. 7
The manner in which our seventh foreign war (that with Germany)
was declared, in April, 1917, was largely followed when, in December,
1917, our eighth foreign war was declared against Austria-Hungary.
The President made an address to Congress, in which, referring to the
war between the United States and Germany, he said that he should not
go back to relate its causes, but desired to consider its objectives. As to
what these were, he continued, he and Congress were "the spokesmen
of the American people." The great and immediate object was "to
make conquest of peace by arms." The United States could not regard
the German Government as the spokesman of the German people.
When that people should say, "through properly accredited represen-
tatives," that they would agree to a settlement "based upon justice and
the reparation of the wrongs their rulers have done, the United States
would regard the war as won." This country did "not wish in any way
to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire." Nor was
any interference with the internal affairs of Germany intended. The
worst that could happen to her people was that if they continued to be
7 Talbot v. Janson, 3 Dal., 133, 160.
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under masters interested to disturb the peace of the world, "it might be
impossible to admit them to the partnership of nations which must
henceforth guarantee the world's peace," or "to admit Germany to the
free economic intercourse which must inevitably spring out of the other
partnerships of a real peace." Finally, he recommended as a military
necessity an immediate declaration that the United States was in a
state of war with Austria-Hungary, now "simply the vassal of the
German Government," and "not acting upon its own initiative or in
response to the wishes and feelings of its own peoples, but as the instru-
ment of another nation."
He then reverted to the reasons for which the United States had
entered into war. It had "been forced into it" to save its political in-
stitutions "from corruption and destruction." "The purposes of the
Central Powers," he added, "strike straight at the very heart of ever3-
thing we believe in; their methods of warfare outrage every principle of
humanity and of knightly honor; their intrigue has corrupted the very
thought and spirit of many of our people; their sinister and secret
diplomacy has sought to take our very territory away from us and
disrupt the union of the States. Our safety would be at an end, and our
honor forever sullied and brought into contempt, were we to permit
their triumph. They are striking at the very existence of democracy
and liberty. It is because it is for us a war of high, disinterested purpose,
in which all the free people of the world are banded together for the vin-
dication of right, a war for the preservation of our nation and of all that
it has held dear of principle and of purpose, that we feel ourselves doubly
constrained to propose for its outcome only that which is righteous and
of irreproachable intention, for our foes as well as for our friends. The
cause being just and holy, the settlement must be of like motive and
quality. For this we can fight, but for nothing less noble or less worthy
of our traditions. For this cause we entered the war and for this cause
will we battle until the last gun is fired."
The House Committee of Foreign Affairs, on the day (December 5th)
when this address was delivered, agreed unanimously to report a declara-
tion of war with this preamble:
Whereas, the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government
has severed diplomatic relations with the Government of the United
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States of America, and has committed acts of war against the Govern-
ment and the people of the United States of America, among which are
its adherence to the policy of ruthless submarine warfare adopted by
its ally, the Imperial German Government, with which the United States
of America is at'war, and by giving to its ally active support and aid
on both land and sea in the prosecution of war against the Government
and people of the United States of America; therefore, be it, etc.
On further consideration and consultation with the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, the Act of December 7, 1917, was passed,
in which for the preamble in the original draft was substituted the
following:
Whereas, the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government
has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and the
people of the United States of America; therefore be it, etc.
The final draft of the declaration of war against Austria-Hungary,
therefore, unlike the earlier draft of the House committee, hardly seems
to comply with the spirit of the Hague Convention of 1907, if read
without reference to the previous address of the President on the subject
of such a war. If, on the other hand, passed as it was with substantial
unanimity, it may properly be read as approving and supplementing
that address, and as incorporating the gist of that into itself, any such
ground for criticism would be removed. In that all-important state
paper, the President, it will be remembered, used the word we to signify
himself and Congress. In other words, he spoke for both. To hold
that he could properly do this would be to advance little, if at all, the
prerogatives of the Executive. There is no people in the world today
whose chief ruler has an extent of war power equal to that of the Presi-
dent of the United States. He is independent of cabinet control. He
can call the ministers of the different departments of" executive power
into council with him or not, as he sees fit. He can indicate govern-
mental policy in unofficial correspondence or public addresses, without
reserve. He has for any such address what Lord Bryce has described
as "an unrivaled platform."
In 1908 the Kaiser gave permission to publish the report of an inter-
view between him and a foreigner upon an important matter of foreign
policy. At once, he was called to account before the Reichstag. The
Imperial Chancellor, as president of the Bundesrath, has a right to be
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present at the deliberations of the Reichstag. The Chancellor at
that time appeared before it and substantially repudiated what the
Emperor had said at the interview in question, practically pledging
himself that in the future nothing of such a nature would be said
by the Crown that had not the previous approval of the constituted
authorities. 8
The President of the United States is subject to no such restraints.
He holds an office which makes him in all other matters affecting inter-
national intercourse the spokesman of the whole country. Is he any the
less such with respect to a declaration of war? He holds, not a part,
but the whole, of the executive power of the United States. Its scope
is not circumscribed by many limitations. Of such as there are, two
are of particular importance, namely, the provision that while he alone
can negotiate treaties, they are of no force until ratified by a two-thirds
vote of the Senate; and that by which, while he alone can nominate to
the higher public offices, the appointments can only be made with the
consent of a majority vote of the Senate.
Four powers, though in their nature and history primarily of an
executive character, are expressly conferred: namely, that of receiving
ambassadors and other public ministers; that of commissioning all
officers of the United States; that of granting reprieves and pardons;
and that of a conditional veto. These four lines of authority are not
strictly a part of the executive power of the United States, though,
regarded as a matter of general political government, they belong in
their nature to the executive power.
Two things are certain, when the functions of the President are con-
sidered with respect to their relation to a declaration of war. He has
the right, and is under the duty, to communicate to Congress, before
such a declaration is made, the facts and circumstances that in his
opinion may call for it. It is also of no force, unless he approve it. It
is certain, further, that he cannot approve it in part and disapprove it
in part. He must, as in the case of any other measures of legislation,
approve the whole or disapprove the whole.
There are then three stages in proceedings for declaring war by the
United States. The first comes with the doings of the President in
8 American Political Science Review, XI, 660.
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informing Congress of the state of our relations with the Power against
which war may be declared. The second is the doings of Congress in
making the declaration, and the third is the approval of the declaration
by the President.
The second stage has become much more important since the Hague
Convention of 1907, ratified by us and by Germany and Austria-Hun-
gary in 1909, which requires the declaration, if not connected with an
ultimatum, to state the reasons (motifs) for its adoption. The Presi-
dent, it may be assumed, if he recommends a declaration of war, will
always state what seem to him the reasonable grounds for it. Congress
may coincide with him in his views and give the same reasons for its
action which the President has given. It may, however, coincide with
him in his conclusion, but prefer to rest the declaration on a part only of
the grounds specified by him, or even on grounds not stated by him at
all. He has had his say, and Congress is now to speak and to speak
decisively, subject always to the conditional veto.
Whenever a declaration of war has been enacted and approved, it
unquestionably becomes the right and duty of the President to give
public notice of it to all neutral Powers. To the Power against which
war is declared no formal notice is absolutely necessary before the
opening of hostilities, nor indeed ever. It will hear of it soon enough
through channels of information open to all.
The most important thing here is to give notice of the fact of the
declaration, and the time of its going into effect. It is less necessary
to specify immediately the grounds on which it rests. As to what these
are, is the declaration itself now the sole evidence? Or can the Presi-
dent, in making his announcements to foreign nations, add to or sub-
tract from those declared by Congress to support its action?
"Results, not processes," Samuel Warren once wrote, "are for the
eye of the world." It must be remembered that in announcing a decla-
ration of war, the chief end in view is to state the fact of the existence
of war, as evidenced by such a declaration. The grounds for it, or the
want of grounds for it, have become, for the time being, comparatively
unimportant.
John Bassett Moore begins his consideration of the title "War"
in his Digest of International Law, by this remark:
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Much confusion may be avoided by bearing in mind the fact that by
the term "War" is meant not the mere employment of force, but the
existence of the legal condition of things in which rights are or may be
prosecuted by force.
A declaration of war announces, or creates and announces, such a
legal condition of things. It may or may not go into further particulars,
according to the position of the government making it, in regard to the
Hague Convention of 1907. If it states what constitutes this legal
condition, and purports to describe the controlling facts leading up to
the declaration, its validity and effect will not depend on the truth or
falsity or relevancy of what may be set forth in its assignment of causes.
They are mentioned merely to give public notice of the grievances which
the nation making it claims to have suffered from the nation against
which it is directed.
A declaration of war at once charges the President with a double
responsibility. In addition to his holding the civil executive powe, he
must now assume the supreme direction and command of military and
naval activities. This, however, he takes subject to limitations- not
ordinarily existing in other countries.
As the Supreme Court of the United States has held in a leading base,
the duty and power of the President under a declaration of war are
"purely military," and if he makes conquests they cannot
extend the operation of our institutions and laws beyond the limits
before assigned to them by the legislative power. . . .The genesis and
character of our institutions are peaceful, and the power to declare war
was not conferred upon Congress for the purpose of aggression or
aggrandizement, but to enable the general government to vindicate by
arms, if it should become necessary, its own rights and the rights of its
citizens. . .. A war, therefore, declared by Congress, can never be
presumed to be waged for the purpose of conquest or the acquisition of
territory; nor does the law declaring the war imply an authority to the
President to enlarge the limits of the United States, by subjugating the
enemy's country. 10
The war power, however, as shared between the President and Con-
gress, is not limited to achieving military successes. "It carries with
it inherently the power to guard against the immediate renewal of the
10 Fleming v. Page, 9 How., 603, 614.9 VII, 153.
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conflict, and to remedy the evils which have arisen from its rise and
progress." 11
As the war power is shared between the President and Congress,
but Congress does not share in the executive power, the breadth of the
President's prerogatives as to the closing of a war becomes of special
importance. The limits imposed directly by the Constitution are few;
its main one being the requirement of the consent of the Senate. Those
imposed by implication are, so far as the courts have thus far spoken,
also few, but of high importance.
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people,
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection
all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doc-
trine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by
the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during
any of the great exigencies of government. 2
The preamble of the Constitution must also be considered in this
connection. "We the people of the United States, in order to form a
more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity,
provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and se-
cure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain
and establish this constitution for the United States of America." May
this be construed to include a delegation of power to declare war in order
to secure liberty to foreign peoples? Our war with Spain assumed that
there is such a power, and the assumption met with general public ac-
quiescence. It was made by the President, this year, in advising the
declaration of war by the United States against Germany and Austria-
Hungary; repeated in his public letters and addresses, and has a strong
current of .public sentiment in its support. In view of the general
trend of opinion as to enlarging the functions of the general government,
it is quite unlikely that the courts will ever take a different view.
To make a declaration of war requires the assent of Congress as well
as of the President. To end a war, it is enough for him to obtain the
assent of the Senate, if he acts under the treaty-making power. Peace
could, no doubt, also be restored by an Act of Congress. As a declara-
U Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall., 493, 507. 12 Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall., 2, 120.
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tion of war takes the shape with us of a statute, it would seem that it
can be repealed by a statute. Its normal effect can also be subjected to
limitations and exceptions resting on the authority of the President
alone.
W ile the general and natural mode of ending a war is by treaty,
peace may presumably be secured also by an absolute conquest followed
by the destruction of the enemy's government. So far as concerns the
United States, however, this would seem excluded by the doctrine of
Fleming v. Page, unless what had been, for the time being, held as
-enemy's territory should be only taken to be turned over to such new
government as the inhabitants might agree to institute.
SIMEON E. BATwIN.
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